Google Calendar phishing campaign hijacks sessions, bypasses MFA
The detail that matters most here is the session cookie, not the password. Stealing a login and one-time code is old news; grabbing an active session token means attackers never have to pass MFA at all. That flips the whole defensive model, because the authentication already happened and the user is legitimately signed in. The only real tell is the session being used from somewhere it shouldn't be.
The calendar invite trick is clever in a grim way. Most people treat a meeting invite as low risk, and the trusted redirect means the URL looks like it goes to a legitimate domain before bouncing to a fake page. That combination slips past both spam filters and the human instinct to check the link. I'd want to know how many of those 900 domains were freshly registered versus repurposed, because that changes how fast defenders can respond next time.
I think the takeaway for teams is to stop treating MFA as the finish line. Session monitoring, device posture checks, and short token lifetimes do more against this attack than another authentication step. The campaign shows the gap between what vendors promise and what attackers actually target.
